Abstract. We study the automatic synthesis of fair non-repudiation protocols, a class of fair exchange protocols, used for digital contract signing. First, we show how to specify the objectives of the participating agents and the trusted third party as path formulas in linear temporal logic and prove that the satisfaction of these objectives imply fairness; a property required of fair exchange protocols. We then show that weak (co-operative) co-synthesis and classical (strictly competitive) co-synthesis fail, whereas assume-guarantee synthesis (AGS) succeeds. We demonstrate the success of AGS as follows: (a) any solution of AGS is attack-free; no subset of participants can violate the objectives of the other participants; (b) the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner certified mail protocol that has known vulnerabilities is not a solution of AGS; (c) the Kremer-Markowitch non-repudiation protocol is a solution of AGS; and (d) AGS presents a new and symmetric fair non-repudiation protocol that is attack-free. To our knowledge this is the first application of synthesis to fair non-repudiation protocols, and our results show how synthesis can both automatically discover vulnerabilities in protocols and generate correct protocols. The solution to AGS can be computed efficiently as the secure equilibrium solution of three-player graph games.
with a proof system, can be used to generate protocols satisfying those goals. The authors use their approach to synthesize the Needham-Schroeder protocol; they do not address digital contract signing. The work of [ATHCR08] uses multi-player games to obtain correct solutions of multi-party rational exchange protocols in the emerging area of rational cryptography. These protocols do not provide fairness, but do ensure that rational parties would have no reason to deviate from the protocol. None of the above works use a conditionally competitive synthesis formulation, which we show is necessary for fair non-repudiation protocols. Our technique is very different from these and all previous works, as we use the rich body of research in controller synthesis to construct fair exchange protocols efficiently; in time that is quadratic in the size of the model. The finite state models are typically small, so that the application of synthesis techniques as we propose in this paper is both appealing and realizable in practice.
Fair non-repudiation protocols
In this section we introduce fair non-repudiation protocols. We first define a participant model, a protocol model and an attack model. We then introduce the agents and the TTP that participate in fair exchange protocols, the messages that they may send and receive, and the channels over which they communicate. Next, we introduce a set of predicates that are set on messages that are sent and received and that form the basis for our protocol and participant objectives in the subsequent section. Finally, we describe three of the protocols that we use for the analysis of our synthesis technique, presenting the set of messages that are exchanged in these protocols together with the behavior of the TTP in each of these protocols.
A participant model Our protocol model is different from the Strand Space model [THG99] and is closer to the model required for the synthesis of protocols as participant refinements. We define our model as follows: let V be a finite set of variables that take values in some domain 
, that given a control point, a valuation over V i and a message either sent or received by A i , returns the next control point of A i and an updated valuation. The participants may send messages simultaneously and independently, and can either receive a message or send a message at every control point.
The most general participants We interpret the elements of A as the most general participants in an exchange; the participants in A can send any message that can be composed at each control point, based on messages they have received up to that control point. We take the interaction between the elements of A as the most general exchange program. Every participant in an exchange has her own objective to satisfy. We take the objective of a participant as a set of desired sequences of valuations of the protocol variables.
A protocol model A realization of an exchange protocol is a restriction of the most general exchange program that consists of the set A {A i | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} of participants, with behaviors restricted by the rules of the protocol. We (l , v , m) δ i (l , v , m) . We define a protocol instance (or a protocol run) as any sequence of valuations generated by the participants in A and take the set of all possible protocol runs as Runs(A ). We refer to a message that can be sent by a participant as a move of that participant.
An attack model
We define an attack on a protocol as the behavior of a subset of protocol participants such that the resulting sequence of messages is in their objective but not in the objective of at least one of the other participants. Agents An agent in a two-party exchange protocol is one of the two participating entities signing an online contract. Based on whether an agent proposes a contract or accepts a contract originating from another agent, we get two roles that an agent can play; that of an originator of a contract, designated by O or the recipient of a contract, designated by R. Agents communicate with each other over channels.
Trusted third party
The trusted third party or TTP is a participant who is trusted by the agents and adjudicates and resolves disputes. It is known that a fair exchange protocol cannot be realized without the TTP [EY80, PG99] . We model the TTP explicitly as a participant, define her objective and using our formulation give a game-theoretic justification that the TTP is necessary. Agents and the TTP communicate with each other over channels. The earliest non-repudiation protocols assumed an online TTP where the TTP participates in every exchange. This has several disadvantages as outlined below,
• The TTP may become a bottleneck as the number of digital exchanges increase.
• There is a higher propensity for malicious entities to bring down the site of the TTP using denial-of-service attacks, as the TTP, in this case, is central to all digital exchanges.
• Since all (or most) transactions do not involve malicious participants, using an online TTP to participate in all transactions is inefficient and is an undesirable design goal.
• An online TTP does not enable a self-regulated exchange of digital content, unlike an offline TTP combined with attack-free protocols.
We therefore do not consider the case of protocols that involve an online TTP, but instead focus on attack-free protocols that use an offline TTP as per prevailing research directions in this area.
Messages A message is an encrypted stream of bytes; we treat each message as an atomic unit. We assume each message contains a nonce that uniquely identifies a protocol instance; participants can simultaneously participate in multiple protocol instances. We are not concerned with the exact contents of each message, but in what each message conveys; this is in keeping with our objective of synthesizing protocols that are attack-free with respect to message interleavings. From the definition of messages in fair exchange protocols in [KR02, KMZ02, KR03, SM02] and other works, we define the set M of messages as follows:
• m 1 is a message that may be sent by O to R. The intent of this message is to convey O's desire to sign a contract with a recipient R.
• m 2 is a message that may be sent by R upon receiving m 1 to O. This conveys R's intent to sign the contract sent by O.
• m 3 is a message that may be sent by O to R upon receiving m 2 and contains the actual signature of O.
• m 4 is a message that contains the actual signature of R and may be sent by R to O upon receiving m 3 .
• a O 1 is a message that may be sent by O to the TTP and conveys O's desire to abort the protocol.
• a O 2 (resp. a R 2 ) is a message that may be sent by the TTP to O (resp. R) that confirms the abort by including an abort token for O (resp. R).
• r O 1 (resp. r R 1 ) is a message that may be sent by O (resp. R) to the TTP and conveys O's (resp. R's) desire to get the TTP to resolve a protocol instance by explicitly requesting the TTP to adjudicate. We do not specify the content of r O 1 or r R 1 but make the assumption that the TTP needs m 1 to recover the protocol for R and similarly needs m 2 to recover the protocol for O.
• r O 2 (resp. r R 2 ) is a message that may be sent by the TTP to O (resp. R) and contains a universally verifiable signature in lieu of the signature of R (resp. O).
The messages that each participant can send in a state depends on what the participant knows in that state. We assume that every recipient can check if the message she receives contains what she expects and that it originates from the purported sender.
Remark 1
The order of messages m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , and m 4 . We impose an order on the messages m 1 , m 2 , m 3 and m 4 as it can be shown trivially in our synthesis formulation that O sending m 3 before receiving m 2 and R sending m 4 before receiving m 3 does not guarantee satisfaction of their respective objectives. Further, since our concern in this paper is not to synthesize messages impervious to attacks, but rather the correct sequences of messages that are impervious to attacks, we assume the former can be accomplished by the use of appropriate cryptographic primitives. In our formulations, we consider a reasonable TTP that satisfies the following restrictions on behavior:
1. The TTP will never send a message unless it receives an abort or a resolve request. 2. The TTP processes messages in a first-in-first-out fashion. 3. If the first message received by the TTP is an abort request, then the TTP will eventually send an abort token. 4. If the first message received by the TTP is a resolve request, then the TTP will eventually send an agent signature.
Channels.
A channel is used to deliver a message. There are three types of channels that are typically modeled in the literature. We present them here in decreasing order of reliability:
1. An operational channel delivers all messages within a known, finite amount of time. 2. A resilient channel eventually delivers all messages, but there is no fixed finite bound on the time to deliver a message. 3. An unreliable channel may not deliver all messages eventually.
We model the channels between the agents as unreliable and those between the agents and the TTP as resilient as in prevailing models; messages sent to the TTP and by the TTP will eventually be delivered. We do not model the channels explicitly, but synthesize protocols irrespective of channel behavior. In particular, unreliable channels may never deliver messages and messages sent to the TTP may arrive in any order at the TTP.
Scheduler. The scheduler is not explicitly part of any fair exchange protocol. The protocol needs to provide all agents the ability to send messages asynchronously. This implies that the agents can choose their actions simultaneously and independently. We model this behavior by using a fair scheduler that assigns each participant a turn and we synthesize refinements against all possible behaviors of a fair scheduler.
Predicates. We introduce the following set of predicates.
• M 1 is set by O, when she sends message m 1 to R.
• EOO, referred to as the Evidence Of Origin, is set by R when either m 1 or r R 2 is received.
• EOR, referred to as the Evidence of Receipt, is set by O when either m 2 or r is set by R when he receives r R 2 ; the subscript k is used to distinguish the actual signature on the contract from the intent to sign the contract; the superscripts are used to denote whether the signature is from O or the TTP. • AO is set by O and indicates that a O 2 has been received.
• AR is set by R and indicates that a R 2 has been received.
• ABR is set by the TTP when an abort request, a O 1 is received.
• RES is set by the TTP when a resolve request, r O 1 or r R 1 , is received. All predicates are monotonic in that once they are set, they remain set for the duration of a protocol instance [SM02] . We distinguish between a signature sent by an agent and the signature sent by the TTP as a replacement for an agent's signature in the predicates. Distinguishing these signatures enables modeling TTP accountability [SM02] . The NRO for R, denoted by NRO, means that R has received both O's intent to sign a contract and O's signature on the contract so that O cannot deny having signed the contract to a third party. Formally, NRO is defined as:
The NRR for O, denoted by NRR, means that O has received both the intent and signature of R on a contract so that R cannot deny having signed the contract to a third party. Formally, NRR is defined as: NRR EOR ∧ (EOR R k ∨ EOR TTP k ). The intent to sign a contract together with the actual signature on the contract are considered irrefutable proof of an agent's commitment to a contract. In other words, these pieces of evidence are sufficient to prove to an outside entity an agent's commitment to a contract that cannot be repudiated by the agent.
The KM, ASW, and GJM protocols. The protocols we study have a main protocol that involves the exchange of messages m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , and m 4 with abort and resolve subprotocols that differ based on the behavior of the TTP. The main protocol enables the exchange of digital signatures between honest participants without involving the TTP. The main protocol of the KM, ASW, and GJM protocols is defined in terms of messages in Protocol 1. The protocols provide the originator, O, the ability to abort a protocol instance after it has been initiated. This is handled by the abort subprotocol. Similarly, either agent can use the resolve subprotocol to get the TTP to issue signatures in lieu of the other agent, when the main protocol is disrupted either due to a malicious agent or due to messages not being delivered over unreliable channels. The difference between the KM, ASW, and the GJM protocols, relevant to a synthesis formulation using logical specifications, is in the behavior of the TTP. Therefore, the abort subprotocol and the resolve subprotocol are defined in terms of the behavior of the TTP in Table 1 .
LTL specifications for protocol requirements
The synthesis of programs requires a formal objective of their requirements. One of our contributions in this paper is to present a precise and formal description of the protocol requirement as a path formula in LTL [Pnu77, MP91] , which then becomes our synthesis objective. In this section, we define the objective for fair non-repudiation protocols, objectives for the agents and the TTP and show that satisfaction of the objectives of the agents and the TTP imply satisfaction of the objective of the protocols. We use LTL, a logic that is used to specify properties of infinite paths in finite-state transition systems; LTL formulas are interpreted as subsets of these infinite paths that satisfy the formulas. In our specifications, we use the usual LTL notations and ♦ to denote always (safety) and eventually (reachability) specifications, respectively.
Fairness.
Informally, fairness for O can be stated as "For all protocol instances if the non-repudiation of origin (NRO) is ever true, then eventually the non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) is also true" [KR03] . The fairness property for O is expressed by the LTL formula
Similarly, the fairness property for R is expressed by the LTL formula ϕ R f (NRR ⇒ ♦NRO). We say that a protocol is fair, if in all instances of the protocol, fairness for both O and R holds. Hence the fairness requirement for the protocol is expressed by the formula
Abuse-freeness. The definition of abuse-freeness as given in [GJM99] , is the following: "An optimistic contract signing protocol is abuse-free if it is impossible for a single player at any point in the protocol to be able to prove to an outside party that he has the power to terminate (abort) or successfully complete the contract". In [CMSS03] , the authors prove that in any fair optimistic protocol, an optimistic participant yields an advantage to the other participant. In a given protocol instance, once an agent has the other agent's intent to sign a contract, he can use this intent to negotiate a different contract with a third party, while ensuring that the original protocol instance is aborted. The term aborted is used here to mean that neither agent can get a non-repudiation evidence in a given protocol instance, once that instance is aborted. As noted by the authors of [CMSS03] , the best that one can hope for is to prevent either participant from proving to a third party that he has an advantage, or in other words, that he has the other participant's intent to sign the contract. This is defined as abuse-freeness. As noted by the authors of [GJM99, KR02] , using PCS or private contract signatures, introduced by Garay et al. [GJM99] , which provides the designated verifier property, neither agent can prove the other agent's intent to sign the contract to anyone other than the TTP. Therefore, ensuring abuse-freeness requires the use of PCS. A PCS for a message m, from a sender to a receiver, given a TTP, is a cryptographic object that can be created either by the sender of m or the receiver upon receiving m. Further, PCS enjoy the additional property that the TTP is the only outside entity that can distinguish between the PCS created by the sender and the PCS created by the receiver. Therefore, the receiver of a message cannot prove to a third party that the message was created by the sender, thus ensuring abuse-freeness. Since PCS are requisite to ensure abuse-freeness, we do not model abuse-freeness, or the stronger property balance [CKS01] , in our formalism. We remark that primitives such as private contract signatures (PCS) introduced by Garay et al. [GJM99] , can be used with protocols that are synthesized using our technique to ensure abuse-freeness.
Timeliness. Informally, timeliness [ASW98] , is defined as follows: "A protocol respects timeliness, if both agents always have the ability to reach, in a finite amount of time, a point in the protocol where they can stop the protocol while preserving fairness". We do not model timeliness in this paper as the cases in the literature where timeliness is compromised involve the lack of an abort subprotocol. Since we explicitly include the capability to abort the protocol, our solution provides timeliness as guaranteed by existing protocols. Alternatively, timeliness could be explicitly modeled in the specifications of the agents and the TTP, but in the interest of keeping the objectives simpler so that we convey the more interesting idea of using AGS, we avoid modeling timeliness explicitly.
Signature exchange. A protocol is an exchange protocol if it enables the exchange of signatures. This is also referred to as Viability in the literature. For an exchange protocol to be a non-repudiation protocol, at the end of every run of the protocol, either the agents have their respective non-repudiation evidences, or, if they do not have their non-repudiation evidences, they have the abort token. The property that evidences once obtained are not repudiable is referred to as Non-repudiability. A fair non-repudiation protocol must satisfy fairness, abuse-freeness, non-repudiability and viability.
We now present intuitive objectives for the agents and the TTP and show that satisfaction of these objectives implies that the protocols we synthesize are fair.
Specification for the originator O. The objective of the originator O is expressed as follows:
• In all protocol instances, she eventually sends the evidence of origin. This is expressed by the LTL formula ϕ 
The objective ϕ O of O can therefore be expressed by the following LTL formula
There are two interpretations of the abort token in the literature. On the one hand the abort token was never intended to serve as a proof that a protocol instance was not successfully completed; it was to guarantee that the TTP would never resolve a protocol after it has been aborted. On the other hand, there is mention of the abort token being used by the recipient to prove that the protocol was aborted. We take the position that the abort token may be used to ensure TTP accountability as noted in [SM02] and never gets the abort token AR. This is expressed by the LTL formula
(a)
The recipient eventually gets the abort token and, (b) the originator never gets his signature EOR R k and never gets his signature EOR TTP k from the TTP. This is expressed by the LTL formula
The objective ϕ R can therefore be expressed by the LTL formula
If the TTP misbehaves and issues both EOO TTP k and AR, we claim that the objective ϕ R of the recipient should be violated, but in this case he has the power to prove that the TTP misbehaved by presenting both EOO 
• In all protocol instances, if the originator's signature EOO TTP k has been sent to the recipient, then the originator should eventually get the recipient's signature EOR TTP k and the agents should never get the abort token. This can be expressed by the LTL formula
• Symmetrically, in all protocol instances, if the recipient's signature EOR TTP k has been sent to the originator, then the recipient should eventually get the originator's signature EOO TTP k and the agents should never get the abort token. This can be expressed by the LTL formula
• In all protocol instances, if the originator gets the abort token AO, then the recipient should eventually get the abort token AR and the originator should never get the recipient's signature EOR 
The objective ϕ TTP of the TTP is then defined as:
Note that our objective for the TTP treats both agents symmetrically. In this paper we present AGS for the above objective of the TTP. But in general, the objective of the TTP can be weakened if desired, by treating the agents asymmetrically, and the AGS technique can be applied with this weakened objective. We remark that the specifications of the participants in our protocol model are sequences of messages. Using predicates that are set when messages are sent or received by the agents or the TTP, we transform those informal specifications into formal objectives using the predicates and LTL. The following theorem shows that the objectives we have introduced (2)-(4) imply fairness (1).
Theorem 1 (Objectives imply fairness)
Proof To prove the assertion, assume towards a contradiction that there exists a path that satisfies ϕ O ∧ ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP but does not satisfy ϕ f . We consider the case when the path does not satisfy the first conjunct ϕ 
Consider the objective ϕ 
Co-synthesis
In this section we first define processes, schedulers and objectives for synthesis along the lines of [CH07] . Next we define traditional co-operative [CE82] and strictly competitive [PR89, RW87] versions of the co-synthesis problem; we refer to them as weak co-synthesis and classical co-synthesis, respectively. We then define a formulation of cosynthesis introduced in [CH07] called assume-guarantee synthesis. We show later in the paper that the protocol model of Sect. 2 reduces to the process model for synthesis that we present in this section.
Variables, valuations, and traces. Let X be a finite set of variables such that each variable x ∈ X has a finite domain
. .) for the restriction of τ (X ) to the variables in Y . The restriction operator is lifted to sets of valuations, and to sets of traces.
Processes and refinement. Let Moves be a finite set of moves. For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a process is defined by the tuple
1. X i is a finite set of variables of process P i with X 3 i 1 X i being the set of all process variables, 2. i :
Moves \ ∅ is a move assignment that given a valuation in F i [X i ], returns a non-empty set of moves, where F i [X i ] is the set of valuations on X i , and 3.
The set of process variables X may be shared between processes. The processes only choose amongst available moves at every valuation of their variables as determined by their move assignment. The transition function maps a present valuation and a process move to a non-empty set of possible successor valuations such that each successor valuation has a unique pre-image. The uniqueness of the pre-image is a property of fair exchange protocols; unique messages convey unique content and generate unique valuations.
In other words, the refined process P i has possibly more variables than the original process P i , at most the same moves as the moves of the original process P i at every valuation, and every possible update of the variables in X i given i by P i is a possible update by P i . We write P i P i to denote that P i is a refinement of P i . Given refinements P 1 of P 1 , P 2 of P 2 and P 3 of P 3 , we write X X 1 ∪ X 2 ∪ X 3 for the set of variables of all refinements, and we denote the set of valuations on X by F[X ].
Schedulers.
Given processes P i , where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a scheduler Sc for P i chooses at each computation step whether it is process P 1 's turn, process P 2 's turn or process P 3 's turn to update her variables. Formally, the scheduler Sc is a function Sc :
* → {1, 2, 3} that maps every finite sequence of global valuations (representing the history of a computation) to i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, signaling that process P i is next to update her variables. The scheduler Sc is fair if it assigns turns to P 1 , P 2 and P 3 infinitely often; i.e., for all traces
ω , there exist infinitely
Given three processes P 1 (X 1 , 1 , δ 1 ), P 2 (X 2 , 2 , δ 2 ) and P 3 (X 3 , 3 , δ 3 ), a scheduler Sc for P 1 , P 2 and P 3 , and a start valuation v 0 ∈ F[X ], the set of possible traces is:
Note that during turns of one process P i , the values of the private variables X \ X i of the other processes remain unchanged. We define the projection of traces to moves as follows:
Specifications.
A specification ϕ i for process P i is a set of traces on X ; that is,
We consider only ω-regular specifications [Tho97] . We define boolean operations on specifications using logical operators such as ∧ (conjunction) and ⇒ (implication).
The input to the co-synthesis problem is given as follows: for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, processes P i (X i , i , δ i ), specifications ϕ i for process i, and a start valuation v 0 ∈ F.
Weak co-synthesis. The weak co-synthesis problem is defined as follows: do there exist refinements P i (X i , i , δ i ) and a valuation v 0 ∈ F , such that, 1. P i P i and v 0 ↓ X v 0 , and 2. For all fair schedulers Sc for P i we have,
Intuitively, weak co-synthesis or co-operative co-synthesis is a synthesis formulation that seeks refinements P 1 , P 2 and P 3 where the processes co-operate to satisfy their respective objectives.
Classical co-synthesis. The classical co-synthesis problem is defined as follows: do there exist refinements P i (X i , i , δ i ) and a valuation v 0 ∈ F , such that, 1. P i P i and v 0 ↓ X v 0 , and 2. For all fair schedulers Sc for P i we have,
Classical or strictly competitive co-synthesis is a formulation that seeks refinements P 1 , P 2 and P 3 such that P 1 can satisfy ϕ 1 against all possible, and hence adversarial, behaviors of the other processes; similarly for P 2 and P 3 .
Assume-guarantee synthesis. The assume-guarantee synthesis problem is defined as follows: do there exist refinements P i (X i , i , δ i ) and a valuation v 0 ∈ F , such that, 1. P i P i and v 0 ↓ X v 0 , and 2. For all fair schedulers Sc for P i we have,
Assume-guarantee synthesis or conditionally competitive co-synthesis is a formulation that seeks refinements P 1 , P 2 and P 3 such that P 1 can satisfy ϕ 1 as long as processes P 2 and P 3 satisfy their objectives; similarly for P 2 and P 3 . This synthesis formulation is well suited for those cases where processes are primarily concerned with satisfying their own objectives and only secondarily concerned with violating the objectives of the other processes.
We want protocols to be correct under arbitrary behaviors of the participants, and the arbitrary or worst case behavior of a participant without sabotaging her own objective, is to first satisfy her own objective, and only then to falsify the objectives of the other participants. The primary goal of satisfying her own objective, and secondary goal of falsifying other participant objectives formally captures this worst case or arbitrary behavior assumption. We show that this synthesis formulation is the only one that works for fair non-repudiation protocols. While classical co-synthesis can be solved as zero-sum games, AGS can be solved using non-zero-sum games with lexicographic objectives [CH07] . For brevity, we drop the initial valuation v 0 in the set of traces.
Protocol co-synthesis
In this section, we present our results on synthesizing fair non-repudiation protocols. We use the process model in Sect. 4 to define agent and TTP processes, with objectives as defined in Sect. 3. We then introduce the protocol synthesis model and show that classical co-synthesis fails and weak co-synthesis generates unacceptable solutions. We provide a game theoretic justification of the need for a TTP by showing that without the TTP neither classical co-synthesis nor AGS can be used to synthesize fair non-repudiation protocols. We define the set P AGS of assumeguarantee refinements and prove that the refinements are attack-free. We then present an alternate characterization of the set P AGS and show that the Kremer-Markowitch non-repudiation protocol with offline TTP, proposed in [MK01, KMZ02, KR03] , is included in P AGS whereas the ASW certified mail protocol and the GJM protocol are not. Finally, we systematically analyze refinements of the most general agents and the TTP with respect to their membership in P AGS and show the KM protocol can be automatically generated.
The process O.
We distinguish between the set of messages sent by O and the set of messages received by O. We first recall, from Sect. 
; the union of the predicates set by O when she receives messages and the set of predicates set by O when she sends messages. By an abuse of notation, we take the set of all messages that can be sent by O as the moves of process O. By including an idle move ι, which O may choose in lieu of sending a message, we get the following set of moves for O:
The process R. Similar to the case of process O, we define the set of variables of process R as the union of the set of predicates set by R when he sends messages and the set of predicates he sets when he receives messages. We have the predicates EOO, EOO Move ι is the idle move. The states with no outgoing edges are terminal. We consider the most liberal behaviors of the agents wherein the abort and resolve messages can be sent from all states where the agents have the data they need to send those messages. The predicates are monotonic and are shown in the first state at which they hold. In states that can be either agent state, we use the * in the messages a * 2 , r * 1 , r * 2 to denote one of O or R. Abort or resolve requests can be sent from the states marked terminal, but they have no bearing on the outcome of the protocol and hence we omit them
In Fig. 1 , we show an interface automaton for an agent. We present an informal definition of interface automata. For a formal definition see [dAH01] . Informally, an interface automaton captures states of a system with transitions between states dictated by actions, messages being either sent or received in our case, taken by an agent. For a message m, an output action by an agent that corresponds to sending m is denoted by m! whereas as input action that corresponds to the agent receiving message m is denoted by m?. For example, the top edge, labeled m 1 ? in Fig. 1 corresponds to an agent receiving message m 1 whereas the edge labeled m 1 ! corresponds to an agent sending message m 1 . Since an agent can act either as an originator or a recipient, we show the actions available to the agent in both roles in the figure.
The process TTP. The predicates ABR and RES are set by the TTP when she receives an abort or a resolve request from either agent. We add to this the predicates A 
The set of moves for the TTP are defined as follows: Table 1 ; these include the moves for the TTP in the ASW certified mail protocol [ASW98] , the GJM protocol [GJM99] and the KM protocol [MK01] . We show moves for the TTP with and without a persistent database for completeness. Since it is trivially the case that TTP accountability cannot be satisfied without a persistent database, we do not consider the absence of a persistent database in the rest of this paper. The protocol synthesis model. We now have all the ingredients to define our protocol synthesis model. Given process O, process R and process TTP as defined above, we take X X O ∪ X R ∪ X TTP as the joint set of process variables. We take the objectives ϕ O , ϕ R and ϕ TTP for the processes O, R and TTP respectively, as defined in Sect. 3. The set of traces [[O R TTP Sc]], given Sc is a fair scheduler, is then the joint behavior of the most general agents and the most general TTP, subject to the constraint that they can only send messages based on what they know at every valuation of their variables. A protocol is a refinement O O, R R and TTP TTP, where each participant has a restricted set of moves at every valuation of the process variables; the restrictions constituting the rules of the protocol. We take a protocol state as a valuation over the process variables. By an abuse of notation, we represent every state of the protocol by the set of variables that are set to true in that state; for example a valuation f {M 1 , EOO, M 2 , EOR} corresponds to the state of the protocol after messages m 1 and m 2 have been received. f ↓ X R {EOO, M 2 } corresponds to the restriction of the valuation f to the variables of process R; all that R knows in this state is that he has received m 1 and has sent m 2 . We take v 0 as the initial valuation where all variables are false. The set of variables in the refinements O O, R R and TTP TTP are the same as those in processes O, R and TTP, respectively, and all traces begin with the initial valuation v 0 . We do not model the set of channels explicitly but reason against all possible behaviors of unreliable channels. We assume that every message at least includes the name of the sender, is signed with the private key of the sender and encrypted with the public key of the recipient.
Trace equivalence of models. Recall our participant model from Sect. 2, where each participant is the tuple
where L i is a finite set of control points or values taken by a program counter,
, returns the set of messages that can be sent by 
We note that in Theorem 2, when we say all restrictions A i or all refinements O , R , and TTP , the most general participants are included (for example O can be O) and hence Theorem 2 covers trace equivalence for all required cases.
Failure of classical and weak co-synthesis
In this subsection we show that classical co-synthesis fails while weak co-synthesis generates solutions that are not attack-free and are hence unacceptable. We first tackle classical co-synthesis. In order to show failure of classical co-synthesis we need to show that one of the following conditions:
can be violated. We show that for all refinements R of the recipient R, that is, for every sequence of moves ending in a move chosen by R , there exist moves for the other processes O, TTP and Sc, and a behavior of the channels, to extend that sequence such that the objective ϕ R is violated. Since R should satisfy his objective against all possible behaviors of the channels, to show failure of classical co-synthesis it suffices to fix the behavior of all channels. We assume the channels eventually deliver all messages.
Theorem 3 (Classical co-synthesis fails for R) For all refinements R R, the following assertion holds:
Proof We consider every valuation of the process variables and the set of all possible moves that can be selected by R at each valuation. This defines all possible refinements of R. Since every valuation is the result of a finite sequence of moves (messages) chosen (sent) by the agents and the TTP, it suffices to consider all possible finite sequences of messages received, ending in a message chosen by R. Let τ (v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v n ) be a finite sequence of valuations seen in a partial protocol run, where v 0 is the starting valuation. Let σ τ ↓ Moves a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 be the corresponding sequence of n moves seen in the run. At the beginning of a protocol run, we have σ ∅. In the following, on a case by case basis, we show the sequence of moves seen in a partial protocol run, ending in a move chosen by R, followed by moves for O, TTP and Sc that lead to a violation of ϕ R .
R1: m 1 , ι
• Whenever Sc schedules O, she chooses the idle action ι. Since EOO is true, as long as O does not abort the protocol but chooses to remain idle, ϕ R is violated.
• ϕ R and ϕ O are violated but ϕ TTP is satisfied. Since O and the TTP co-operate, O never sends m 3 , instead choosing to use the TTP to get her non-repudiation evidence while denying R the ability to get his evidence. Given this, it is easy to verify that the sequences in the proof are exhaustive. From the agent interface automaton shown in Fig. 1 we can extract all the partial sequences of moves ending in a move of R and similarly for O. In all of the above cases, ϕ R is violated. In all of the above cases ϕ O ∧ ϕ TTP is also violated. This shows that for all counter moves of O and the TTP, violation of the specification of R also violates the specification of O or the TTP.
The following example illustrates that given our objectives, given a reasonable TTP as defined in Sect. 2, weak co-synthesis yields solutions that are not attack-free and are hence unacceptable.
Example 1 (Weak co-synthesis generates unacceptable solutions) Recall from our definition of weak co-synthesis that the solutions to weak co-synthesis are refinements of the agents and the TTP that co-operate to ensure that all traces generated by the refinements are subsets of traces satisfying their individual objectives. to satisfy ϕ TTP . Therefore, solutions that satisfy weak co-synthesis may not be attack-free.
The need for a TTP
We now provide a justification of the need for a TTP in fair non-repudiation protocols, given our synthesis objective. While this follows from [EY80, PG99] , our proof gives an alternative game-theoretic proof through synthesis. We present the following theorem which shows that if we remove the TTP, then both classical and AGS fail to synthesize a fair non-repudiation protocol.
Theorem 4 (Classical and AGS fail without the TTP) For all refinements O
O, the following assertions hold:
2. Assume-guarantee synthesis fails:
Proof We note that as the TTP is not involved, AO, AR, EOO 
Assume-guarantee solutions are attack-free
From Theorem 3, we see that classical co-synthesis does not generate a protocol that is attack-free; it is too strong a formulation to synthesize fair non-repudiation protocols. In this subsection we show that assumeguarantee solutions are attack free; no coalition of participants can violate the objective of at least one of the other participants while satisfying their own objectives.
Let P (O , R , TTP ) be a tuple of refinements of the agents and the TTP. For two refinements P (O , R , TTP ) and P (O , R , TTP ), we write P P if O O , R R and TTP TTP . Given P (O, R, TTP), the most general behaviors of the agents and the TTP, let P AGS be the set of all possible refinements P P that satisfy the conditions of AGS. For a refinement P (O , R , TTP ) to be in P AGS , we require that the refinements O O, R R and TTP TTP satisfy the following conditions: For all fair schedulers Sc, for all possible behaviors of the channels,
We now characterize the smallest restriction on the refinements TTP TTP that satisfy the implication condition,
In order to characterize the smallest restriction on TTP we first define the following constraints on the TTP and prove that they are both necessary and sufficient to satisfy (6). We assume a reasonable TTP, as defined in Sect. 2; in particular she only responds to abort or resolve requests. In the following lemma, in assertion 1 we show that for all refinements TTP TTP that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, we have TTP is inviolable , i.e., neither agent can violate the objective ϕ TTP , and hence satisfies the implication condition (6); in assertion (2) we show that if TTP does not satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, the implication condition (6) is not satisfied.
AGS

Lemma 1 For all refinements TTP
TTP, the following assertions hold: ]}, by the accountability constraint, the agents get their non-repudiation evidences and neither gets the abort token. Therefore, ϕ TTP is satisfied for all these traces and hence (ϕ O ∧ ϕ R ) ⇒ ϕ TTP is also satisfied and the result follows.
if TTP satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, then
[[O R TTP Sc]] ⊆ ϕ TTP ⊆ (ϕ O ∧ ϕ R ) ⇒ ϕ TTP .
if TTP does not satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, then
For assertion 2, consider an arbitrary TTP TTP that does not satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP. We assume a reasonable TTP and consider violation of the AGS constraints on the TTP on a case by case basis. For each case we produce a witness trace that violates the implication condition (ϕ O ∧ ϕ R ) ⇒ ϕ TTP . We proceed as follows:
• Case 1. The abort constraint is violated To produce a witness trace we consider a partial trace that ends in protocol state {M 1 , ABR O }; O requests the TTP to abort the protocol after sending message m 1 but before it is received. Since TTP violates the abort constraint, the only choice of moves for TTP are ι or a • Case 2. The resolve constraint is violated To produce a witness trace we consider a partial trace that ends in protocol state {M 1 , EOO, M 2 , EOR, RES O }; O resolves the protocol after messages m 1 and m 2 have been received. Since TTP violates the resolve constraint, the only choice of moves for TTP are ι or r O 2 . An argument similar to the argument for Cases 1(a) and 1(b) again leads to the satisfaction of ϕ O ∧ ϕ R but a violation of ϕ TTP .
• Case 3. The accountability constraint is violated To produce a witness trace we consider a partial trace that ends in protocol state As we have shown witness traces that do not satisfy the implication condition (ϕ O ∧ ϕ R ) ⇒ ϕ TTP when TTP violates any of the AGS constraints on the TTP, the result follows.
In the following theorem we show that all refinements P ∈ P AGS are attack-free; no subset of participants can violate the objective of at least one of the other participants while satisfying their own objectives. Proof We show that for all refinements P ∈ P AGS there exists no Y -attack for all Y ⊆ {O, R, TTP}. Let P (O , R , TTP ) and A {O, R, TTP} be the set of participants. We have the following cases:
• Case 1. |Y | 0. In this case Y ∅ and (A \ Y ) {O , R , TTP }. Since (A \ Y ) are the refinements in P which is in P AGS , by the weak co-synthesis condition we have, [[P 1 P 2 P 3 Sc]] ⊆ (ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ∧ ϕ 3 ), and hence the objectives ϕ O , ϕ R and ϕ TTP are satisfied. Therefore there is no Y -attack in this case.
• Case 2. |Y | 1. We first show that there is no Y -attack for Y {O}. The case of Y {R} is similar. By Lemma 1 (assertion 2), for all refinements P ∈ P AGS , the refinement TTP must satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP. This implies, by Lemma 1 (assertion 1), neither O nor R can violate ϕ TTP . Since ϕ TTP cannot be violated, a Y -attack in this case must generate a trace where ϕ R is violated but ϕ O is satisfied. But this violates the implication condition, ϕ O ∧ ϕ TTP ⇒ ϕ R , contradicting the assumption that P ∈ P AGS . We now show that there is no Y -attack for Y {TTP}. Since we assume the TTP is reasonable, in all traces where neither agent sends an abort nor a resolve request to the TTP, the TTP cannot violate the agent objectives. In all traces where the first request from the agents is an abort request, given a reasonable TTP, since the trace satisfies ϕ TTP , it must be the case that the response to that request is [a This implies that either the agents get abort tokens or non-repudiation evidences but never both, which implies ϕ O and ϕ R are satisfied in all these traces. Therefore there is no Y -attack in this case as well.
• Case 3. |Y | 2. Since P ∈ P AGS , by the implication conditions of AGS, there cannot be a Y -attack where |Y | 2.
• Case 4. |Y | 3 It is trivially the case that there is no Y -attack as (A \ Y )
∅.
Since we have shown that for all refinements P ∈ P AGS , for all Y ⊆ A, there is no Y -attack in P , we conclude that all refinements in P AGS are attack-free. We now present the following theorem that establishes conditions for any refinement in P AGS to be an attackfree fair non-repudiation protocol.
Theorem 6 (Fair non-repudiation protocols) For all refinements P ∈ P AGS , if [[O R TTP Sc]] ∩(♦NRO∧ ♦NRR) ∅, then P is an attack-free fair non-repudiation protocol.
Proof Consider an arbitrary refinement P (O , R , TTP ) ∈ P AGS . Since P ∈ P AGS , by ∅, the refinement P enables an exchange of signatures and hence is an exchange protocol. Given NRO and NRR are non-repudiation evidences for R and O respectively, we conclude that P is an attack-free fair non-repudiation protocol.
Analysis of existing fair non-repudiation protocols as P AGS solutions
In this subsection we analyze existing fair non-repudiation protocols and check if they are solutions to AGS. To facilitate the analysis, we first present an alternate characterization of the set P AGS of assume-guarantee refinements. We then show that the KM non-repudiation protocol with offline TTP is in P AGS whereas the ASW certified mail protocol and the GJM protocol are not. Finally, we present a systematic exploration of refinements leading to the KM protocol. Towards an alternate characterization of P AGS , we begin by defining constraints on O, similar to the AGS constraints on the TTP that ensure satisfaction of the implication condition for O. We then define maximal and minimal refinements that satisfy all the implication conditions of AGS and introduce a bounded idle time requirement to ensure satisfaction of weak co-synthesis.
AGS constraints on O.
Given P (O, R, TTP), the most general behaviors of the agents and the TTP, we say a refinement P P satisfies the AGS constraints on O, if the following conditions hold: We show in the Appendix the correspondence between P * and the smallest restriction on the moves of O and the TTP so that P * is a witness to P AGS . While there are restrictions on O and the TTP, there are no restrictions on R.
The minimal refinement P * . We present the smallest refinement P * (O * , R * , TTP * ) in P AGS , as the largest restriction on the moves of O, R and the TTP, as follows: The bounded idle time requirement. We say that a refinement P satisfies bounded idle time if O and the TTP in P choose the idle move ι, when scheduled by Sc, at most b times for a finite b ∈ N. In other words, the participants may choose the idle move when scheduled by the scheduler any number of times as long as the number of idle moves chosen is no more than b. We prove that satisfaction of the bounded idle time requirement is both necessary and sufficient to ensure satisfaction of the weak co-synthesis condition of AGS, for all refinements that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP and the AGS constraints on O, in the Appendix.
Alternate characterization of P AGS . We now use P * and P * to provide an alternate characterization of the set P AGS . We first define the following set of refinements P: P {P (O , R , TTP ) | P satisfies bounded idle time; P * P P * ;
TTP satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP} .
The following lemma states that the set P and the set P AGS coincide. It follows from the fact that any refinement P ∈ P satisfies the AGS constrains on O, the AGS constraints on the TTP and the bounded idle time requirement, which are necessary conditions to satisfy both the implication conditions and the weak co-synthesis condition for AGS. This shows that all refinements in P are in P AGS . The key intuition in showing inclusion in the other direction is that the AGS constraints on O, the AGS constraints on the TTP, and the bounded idle time requirement are the smallest restrictions on the moves of the agents and the TTP to ensure satisfaction of both the implication conditions and the weak co-synthesis condition of AGS; they are therefore not only necessary but also sufficient. We present the lemma here and prove it in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 (Alternate characterization of P AGS ) We have P P AGS .
The KM non-repudiation protocol. The KM protocol, like the ASW and GJM protocols consists of a main protocol, an abort subprotocol and a resolve subprotocol. The main protocol is the same as in the ASW and GJM protocols and is defined in terms of messages in Protocol 1. The abort subprotocol and the resolve subprotocol are defined in The ASW certified mail protocol. The ASW certified mail protocol differs from the KM protocol in its abort and resolve sequences. To define the abort protocol, the TTP needs a move req O that can be used to request O to resolve a protocol instance if R has already resolved it. The abort and resolve subprotocols are defined in Table 1 The GJM protocol. The GJM protocol differs in the abort and resolve sequences as shown in Table 1 . Garay et al. [GJM99] introduced the notion of abuse-freeness and invented private contract signatures or PCS, a cryptographic primitive that ensures abuse-freeness and optionally TTP accountability. Further, the GJM protocol is faithful to the informal definition of fairness in that, when a protocol instance is aborted, neither agent gets partial information that can be used to negotiate a contract with a third party. This is ensured by the use of PCS which provides the designated verifier property; only R can verify the authenticity of a message signed by O and vice versa. The use of PCS in addition to the fixes to the original protocol proposed in [SM02] ensure that the protocol is free from replay attacks, is fair and abuse-free. Let P GJM (O GJM , R GJM , TTP GJM ) correspond to the agent and TTP refinements in the GJM protocol. Since TTP GJM neither has move [a Theorem 7 The refinement corresponding to the KM non-repudiation protocol is in P AGS and the refinements corresponding to the ASW certified mail protocol and the GJM protocol are not in P AGS .
Computation.
We can obtain the solution of AGS by solving graph games with secure equilibria [CHJ06] . In fact, the refinements that satisfy AGS precisely correspond to secure equilibrium strategies of players in the game. This result was presented in [CH07] . All the objectives we consider in this paper are boolean combinations of Büchi ( ♦) and co-Büchi (♦ ) objectives. It follows from [CH07] that secure equilibria with combinations of Büchi and co-Büchi objectives can be solved in polynomial time. This gives us a polynomial time algorithm for the AGS of fair exchange protocols.
From P AGS to P KM . We now first present a systematic exploration of the refinements of P (O, R, TTP), the most general behavior of the agents and the TTP, leading to the KM protocol. We begin with P * and proceed towards P * introducing messages one at a time. Of the refinements we studied, we pick the following refinements for brevity of exposition, that we assume satisfy bounded idle time and the AGS constraints on the TTP, and study their properties: 
Analysis of the refinement P * . It is easy to check that while P * ∈ P AGS , it always ends aborted as a O 1 is the only choice of moves for O * after m 1 is sent. It is not an exchange protocol as it does not enable an exchange of signatures.
Analysis of the refinement P 1 . In this case, the agents do not have the ability to resolve the protocol. The objectives of the agent and the TTP then reduce to,
The agent moves that extend partial protocol runs such that the implication conditions of AGS are satisfied in all resulting traces is shown in Table 2 . Each row in the table corresponds to a protocol state and the moves available to O 1 and R 1 at that state, such that the implication conditions of AGS are satisfied in all resulting traces. For example, in the row corresponding to m 1 , we have two move choices for O 1 , one that selects ι and the other that selects a O 1 ; O 1 can choose to wait for R to send m 2 or choose a O 1 . A similar interpretation is attached to the moves of R 1 . We have P * P 1 P * . As P 1 satisfies bounded idle time and the AGS constraints on the TTP, P 1 ∈ P and hence, by Lemma 2, P 1 ∈ P AGS . The refinement P 1 , while attack-free, is not a fair non-repudiation protocol as it does not enable an exchange of non-repudiation evidences. The protocol always ends up aborted as a O 1 is the only move that satisfies ϕ O for O in state {M 1 , EOO} against all behaviors of R and the TTP; once O 1 sends her signature in m 3 , there is no move available to O 1 such that satisfaction of ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP is guaranteed to satisfy ϕ O , as R may decide to stop participating in the protocol.
Analysis of the refinement P 2 . In this case, R has no ability to resolve the protocol. It is easy to verify that P * P 2 P * . Therefore, P 2 ∈ P and hence, by Lemma 2, P 2 ∈ P AGS . This protocol is a fair non-repudiation protocol that satisfies fairness, balance and timeliness. If O does not send m 3 , then R 2 has no choice of moves. But since P 2 satisfies bounded idle time, O 2 will eventually either abort or resolve the protocol. As TTP 2 satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, either both agents get abort tokens or they get their respective non-repudiation evidences eventually.
Analysis of the refinement P 3 . Since O has no ability to abort the protocol, while both agents have the ability to resolve it, the predicates AO and AR are always false. The agent and TTP objectives then reduce to, The moves of the agents that satisfy the objectives of AGS at select protocol valuations represented by message sequences are shown in Table 3 . It is easy to verify that as P * P 3 P * , P 3 ∈ P and hence by Lemma 2, P 3 ∈ P AGS . Since TTP 3 satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, P 3 is a fair non-repudiation protocol similar to the ZG optimistic non-repudiation protocol, but it does not satisfy timeliness [KMZ02] as O does not have the ability to abort the protocol. If message m 1 is not delivered, then O has no choice of moves to satisfy ϕ O , while ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP are satisfied trivially. Balance does not apply in this case as there are no abort moves.
Analysis of the refinement P * .
In the maximal refinement P * goes idle after her first response to an abort or resolve request. P KM is then the KM protocol. We remark that given the choices of moves for the TTP after her first response as suggested by AGS, choosing ι satisfies the informal notion of efficiency. This refinement ensures fairness, balance and timeliness.
A symmetric fair non-repudiation protocol
In the KM, ASW and GJM protocols, R cannot abort the protocol. While the ability of O to abort the protocol after sending m 1 is required in the event m 1 is not delivered or R does not send m 2 , it can be used to abort the protocol even if all channels are resilient or if O decides not to sign the contract after receiving m 2 . The protocols give O the ability to postpone abort decisions but deny R a similar ability. While this does not violate fairness or abuse-freeness as per prevailing definitions, it is not equitable to both agents. If R does not want to participate in a protocol instance, then the only choice of moves for R is ι and not m 2 ; O will then eventually abort the protocol. Once m 2 has been sent, if R decides not to participate in the protocol and not be held responsible for signing the contract, he has no choice of moves. If he decides to ignore m 3 , then O will resolve the protocol resulting in non-repudiation evidences being issued to O, using which she can claim R is obligated by the contract. In this section we present a symmetric fair non-repudiation protocol that gives R the ability to abort the protocol, assuming that the channels between the agents and the TTP are operational. If we enhance the ability of R by including an abort move a R 1 without enhancing O and the TTP, then AGS fails. Since the objective of R is satisfied unconditionally once he gets EOO O k , R can abort the protocol after receiving m 3 but before sending m 4 , with the TTP aborting the protocol for both O and R. In this case ϕ R and ϕ TTP are satisfied, but ϕ O is not, leading to the falsification of the implication condition (ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP ) ⇒ ϕ O of AGS. By enhancing both O and the TTP, using assume-guarantee analysis, we design a new fair non-repudiation protocol that (a) has no Y -attack for all Y ⊆ {O, R}; and (b) that provides R the ability to abort. In the following, we show that if we fix the behavior of the TTP, ensuring TTP inviolability, then the protocol is attack-free.
Consider the following refinement P s (O s , R s , TTP s ) with P * P s defined as follows:
The move req O may be sent by TTP s only after receiving an abort request from R. The move res O may be sent by O s only after receiving req O . We present the main protocol and the abort subprotocol for our symmetric fair non-repudiation protocol in Protocols 2 and 3; the resolve subprotocol is identical to the one in the KM protocol.
To facilitate the assume-guarantee analysis of P s , we present the following enhanced AGS constraints on the TTP that are both necessary and sufficient to ensure TTP inviolability (neither agent can violate ϕ TTP ): The enhanced AGS constraints on the TTP are required both to satisfy the implication condition (ϕ O ∧ϕ R ) ⇒ ϕ TTP and the condition for weak co-synthesis, (ϕ O ∧ ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP ). Since TTP s waits for a bounded number of turns before sending abort tokens to both agents after sending req O , we require that (a) the channels between the agents and the TTP are operational, and (b) the time taken to deliver messages req O and res O be subsumed by the bound on idle time chosen by the TTP between sending req O and abort tokens. As there is no bound on the time taken to deliver messages on resilient channels, the above AGS constraints on the TTP cannot be enforced without operational channels. Consider a partial trace that ends in protocol state {M 1 , EOO, M 2 , EOR, M 3 }; messages m 1 and m 2 have been received and m 3 has been sent. If R now aborts the protocol and the TTP sends req O to O, then resilient channels can delay delivering either req O or res O sufficiently for the TTP to abort the protocol. In this case if m 3 is eventually delivered, ϕ O is violated whereas ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP is satisfied.
In the following lemma we show that in P s , O cannot violate ϕ R while satisfying ϕ O , R cannot violate ϕ O while satisfying ϕ R and O and R cannot violate ϕ TTP while satisfying their objectives. That is, in the refinement
It follows that under the assumption that the TTP does not change her behavior, while satisfying her objective, the symmetric protocol is attack-free. We present the following lemma and prove it in the Appendix. The assumption that the bound on idle time of the TTP between sending req O and abort tokens subsume the time taken for the delivery of messages req O and res O can easily be enforced before the beginning of a protocol; O agrees to participate in the protocol with a given TTP, only if the bound chosen by the TTP is satisfactory. We point out that in state {EOO, M 2 }, if R sends an abort request, he still needs O's co-operation to abort the protocol. Since she has m 2 , she can launch recovery if she so desires by composing res O when she receives req O . But this is identical to the ability of O in aborting the protocol after she sends m 1 . R can resolve the protocol as soon as he receives m 1 and thus hold O as a signatory to the contract even if she decided to abort the protocol after sending m 1 . The protocol is therefore symmetrical to both O and R. In addition, we claim that this version of the protocol provides better quality of service in terms of timeliness; O does not have to wait after sending m 1 for R to send m 2 , in protocol instances where R has no desire to sign the contract. The following theorem states that if the TTP does not change her behavior, then the refinement P s is an attack-free fair non-repudiation protocol. The proof is in the Appendix. From P AGS to P s . We can systematically analyze refinements leading to P s . We begin with a TTP * that satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP and assume that all refinements satisfy bounded idle time. The analyzed refinements are similar to the ones we used to arrive at the KM non-repudiation protocol, with the added refinement that enhances both O and the TTP so that the TTP satisfies the enhanced AGS constraints as defined above. We present a subset of the analyzed refinements below, 
Implementation
We have implemented a prototype for AGS of fair non-repudiation protocols, and to our knowledge this is the first implementation of game-theoretic controller synthesis techniques for the synthesis of security protocols. We describe the four basic steps of our implementation: (1) generation of triples of participant refinements; (2) implementation of the scheduler that considers all relevant schedules; (3) reduction to solutions of graph games with secure equilibrium; and (4) solution of graph games with secure equilibrium. We describe the details below.
1. Our implementation considers triples of refinements O O, R R, and TTP TTP and then explores all possible message sequences given these participant refinements. So one basic step of the implementation is generation of triples O , R , and TTP ; and this step is a simple enumeration.
2. We implemented a scheduler that backtracks and systematically schedules all participants at all protocol states. Using the scheduler, given a subset of refinements, with all other participants being most general, the implementation explores all possible traces and checks if each trace satisfies the required AGS conditions.
3. Note that in checking the satisfaction of the AGS conditions, for the implication conditions we need to consider the most general participants against each of the refinements O , R and TTP . The checking of the implication conditions is achieved by solving secure equilibrium on graph games with lexicographic objectives. The reduction of the AGS to secure equilibrium has been established in [CH07] , where a game on a graph is constructed from the AGS input. We follow the construction as given in [CH07] .
4. Finally we have implemented the secure equilibrium solution for the objectives we consider. The objectives we considered are Büchi and coBüchi objectives. The result of [CHJ06] establishes that the secure equilibrium solution is obtained by solving two zero-sum graph game problems, and a model-checking question. Thus for the secure equilibrium solution we only need to implement zero-sum graph games with Büchi objectives. There are many algorithms for zero-sum games on graphs with Büchi objectives (see [CH12] for pseudo-codes of the algorithms). We implemented the classical algorithm which is the simplest algorithm to solve Büchi games. The running time of the classical algorithm for zero-sum Büchi games is quadratic, O(n · m), where n is the number of states of the graph, and m is the number of transitions.
Thus our implementation generates all possible AGS solutions. Analyzing the refinements using a procedure similar to the one described to obtain P KM from P AGS , we obtain the symmetric protocol.
In Fig. 2 , we show the set of traces in [[O R TTP KM Sc]] generated by our tool. We found our prototype implementation useful in exploring the space of refinements. We leave enhancing our framework to a full-blown synthesis tool for AGS, for future work. 
Conclusion
In this work we introduce and demonstrate the effectiveness of AGS in synthesizing fair exchange protocols. Our main contributions are as follows: (1) We present precise formalization of the protocol requirements as LTL properties (the basic pre-requisite for synthesis). (2) We show that classical (strictly competitive) co-synthesis and weak (co-operative) co-synthesis fail, where as the assume-guarantee (conditionally competitive) synthesis succeeds in generating attack-free protocols. (3) We analyzed the existing protocols and demonstrated that existing protocols with known vulnerabilities are not solutions of the synthesis, whereas the correct solution is a synthesis solution. (4) Moreover, to demonstrate the flexibility of the framework we have shown how new protocols (like the symmetric one) can be automatically obtained by using the synthesis framework. Our main goal has been to introduce a general AGS framework that can be used with a variety of objectives; we considered a TTP objective that treats the agents symmetrically, but the framework can also be used with possibly weaker TTP objectives that treat agents asymmetrically. Using assume-guarantee analysis we have obtained a new symmetric protocol that is attack-free, given the channels to the TTP are operational. While the need for operational channels may be considered impractical, we remark that it is the framework we present that could automatically generate such protocols of theoretical interest in the first place, thus demonstrating the flexibility of the framework. For future work we will study the application of AGS to other security protocols such as multi-party fair exchange and emerging next generation internet protocols.
We now prove Lemma 2. Given a refinement P (O , R , TTP ) P , we first characterize the smallest restriction on O and R that satisfies the implication conditions:
We show that for all refinements R R, the implication condition (7) holds. In order to characterize the smallest restrictions on O that satisfies the implication condition (8), we recall the following constraints on O. We show that these constraints are both necessary and sufficient to satisfy (8).
AGS constraints on O. We say that a refinement O O satisfies the AGS constraints on O if O satisfies the following constraints:
The most flexible refinements O O and R R. We now characterize the most flexible refinements O O and R R that satisfy the implication conditions (
Lemma 4 For all refinements R R, the following assertion holds:
Proof -Case (a). O aborts the protocol In these traces, since ϕ TTP is satisfied, the abort token must have been sent to both agents, and since neither agent will be sent the other's signature and the channels between the agents and the TTP are resilient, the traces satisfy ϕ R , leading to a contradiction. -Case (b). O or R resolve the protocol In these traces, since ϕ TTP is true, the TTP sends EOO TTP k to R and EOR TTP k to O and never sends either AO or AR. This implies, given the channel between the agents and the TTP is resilient, the traces satisfy ϕ R , leading to a contradiction. -Case (c). R chooses move ι In these traces, since ϕ O is true, either O aborts the protocol after sending m 1 or she chooses to abort or resolve the protocol after receiving m 2 . In either case, given the traces satisfy ϕ TTP , by the above argument ϕ R is satisfied as well, irrespective of the behavior of the channel between O and R. This again leads to a contradiction.
Since we have shown that for all traces, either ϕ R is satisfied or satisfaction of ϕ O ∧ ϕ TTP implies satisfaction of ϕ R , we conclude that for all refinements R R the assertion holds. It follows from Lemma 4, that as R can always resolve the protocol in state {EOO} and all successor states, such that the resulting trace satisfies (ϕ O ∧ ϕ TTP ) ⇒ ϕ R , we have m 2 ∈ R ({EOO}). Similarly, m 4 ∈ R ({EOO, M 2 , EOO O k }) as ϕ R is satisfied in all traces where m 3 has been received, thus satisfying
In the following lemma, in assertion 1 we show that for all refinements O O that satisfy the AGS constraints on O, the implication condition (8) is satisfied; in assertion 2 we show that if O does not satisfy the AGS constraints on O, the implication condition (8) is violated. 
if O does not satisfy the AGS constraints on O, then
Proof ; she can wait for R to send m 4 or resolve the protocol. In the set of traces where she eventually receives m 4 , by Case 1, the traces satisfy (ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP ) ⇒ ϕ O . If she does not receive m 4 , she will eventually resolve the protocol to satisfy ϕ O . In the set of traces where she eventually resolves the protocol, since ϕ TTP is satisfied, and R cannot abort the protocol, the TTP will eventually respond to her request by sending her non-repudiation evidence and not the abort token. These traces therefore satisfy ϕ O , leading to a contradiction. -Case (b). O aborts the protocol before sending m 3 Since O satisfies the AGS constraints on O, she cannot abort the protocol in the initial state v 0 . Therefore, O must have started the protocol by sending m 1 . In all these traces, O aborts the protocol after sending m 1 but before sending m 3 and since O satisfies the AGS constraints on O, she will not send m 3 after sending the abort request. Since these traces satisfy ϕ TTP , the abort token must have been sent to both agents, and since neither agent will be sent the other's signature and the channels between the agents and the TTP are resilient, the traces satisfy ϕ O , leading to a contradiction. The weak co-synthesis requirement. Let b ∈ N be a bound on the number of times that O or the TTP may choose the idle move ι when scheduled by Sc. In the following lemma, for all refinements P P * that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, in assertion 1 we show that if b is finite, then the condition for weak co-synthesis is satisfied; in assertion 2 we show that if b is unbounded, then the condition for weak co-synthesis is violated.
Lemma 6 (Bounded idle time lemma) For all refinements P
(O , R , TTP ) P * that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, for all b ∈ N with O and TTP choosing at most b idle moves when scheduled by Sc, the following assertions hold:
Proof For the first assertion, we show that the condition for weak co-synthesis holds against all possible behaviors of the channel between O and R. We have the following cases:
• Case 1. Agents abort or resolve the protocol In all traces where the agents abort or resolve the protocol, given b is finite and that TTP satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, by Lemma 1 (assertion 1), TTP will eventually respond to the first and all subsequent requests such that ϕ TTP is satisfied. In all these traces, given the channels between the agents and the TTP are resilient, both agents get either the abort token or non-repudiation evidences but never both. For the second assertion, given an unbounded b, to show that weak co-synthesis fails, it suffices to show that there exists a behavior of the agents, the TTP and the channels that violates the condition for weak co-synthesis. From Lemma 6, it is both necessary and sufficient that the refinements P P * that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, also satisfy bounded idle time to ensure weak co-synthesis. While O and the TTP should satisfy bounded idle time, there are no restrictions on R. Using Lemmas 1 and 4-6 we now present a proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2 In one direction, consider an arbitrary refinement P (O , R , TTP ) ∈ P. We show that the conditions of assume-guarantee synthesis are satisfied as follows:
• Since we have shown that the refinement P satisfies all the implication conditions and the weak co-synthesis condition of assume-guarantee synthesis, we have P ∈ P AGS . Hence P ⊆ P AGS . In the other direction, consider an arbitrary refinement P (O , R , TTP ) ∈ P AGS . We show that P ∈ P as follows:
• The AGS constraints on O By Lemma 5, since it is both necessary and sufficient that a refinement satisfy the AGS constraints on O to ensure the implication condition (ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP ) ⇒ ϕ O is satisfied, given the implication condition holds, we conclude that P satisfies the AGS constraints on O. Therefore, O O * .
• The AGS constraints on the TTP By Lemma 1, since it is both necessary and sufficient that a refinement satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP to ensure the implication condition (ϕ O ∧ ϕ R ) ⇒ ϕ TTP is satisfied, given the implication condition holds, we conclude that P satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP and TTP TTP * .
• The bounded idle time condition By Lemma 6, since it is both necessary and sufficient that a refinement satisfy bounded idle time to ensure weak co-synthesis, since weak co-synthesis holds in this case, we conclude that P satisfies bounded idle time.
• P P * Since we have shown that O O * and TTP TTP * , we have P P * .
• P * P Since P * is the smallest refinement in the set P AGS , given P ∈ P AGS , it must be the case that P * P .
For P ∈ P AGS , as we have shown that P * P P * , P satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP and satisfies bounded idle time. Thus we have P ∈ P and hence P AGS ⊆ P. The result follows. For all traces where R aborts the protocol, if he has received m 3 , then ϕ R is satisfied. For all traces where R aborts the protocol and message m 3 has not been received, if ϕ TTP is violated, then the implication holds and if ϕ TTP is satisfied, then either both agents get abort tokens or their respective non-repudiation evidences, thus satisfying ϕ R . We have shown that all traces satisfy the implication condition ϕ O ∧ ϕ TTP ⇒ ϕ R . Since we have a fixed TTP that satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, we have ϕ TTP is satisfied in all traces by Case 1. As ϕ O is satisfied by assumption, we conclude ϕ R is satisfied as well. Therefore, there is no Y -attack in this case. O . In all these traces, since TTP s satisfies bounded idle time and the AGS constraints on the TTP, either both agents get non-repudiation evidences or abort tokens but never both, thus satisfying ϕ O . Therefore, all these traces satisfy (ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP ) ⇒ ϕ O , which given ϕ R is satisfied by assumption and ϕ TTP is satisfied by Case 1, implies ϕ O is satisfied as well. There is no Y -attack in this case.
• Case 2. | Y | 0 In this case Y ∅ and (A \ Y ) {O s , R s , TTP s }. Since P s satisfies bounded idle time, in all traces where R does not abort the protocol, by Lemma 6, the condition for weak co-synthesis is satisfied. In all traces where R aborts the protocol, as TTP s satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, she sends req O . In all these traces, since TTP s and O s satisfy bounded idle time, and the channels are operational, O s chooses ι or sends res O and TTP s responds with either abort tokens or non-repudiation evidences but not both, leading to the satisfaction of ϕ O and ϕ R . Since ϕ TTP is satisfied by Case 1, all these traces satisfy (ϕ O ∧ ϕ R ∧ ϕ TTP ). Therefore, there is no Y -attack in this case.
The result follows.
